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DEFINING “PRODUCTION IN PAYING  
QUANTITIES”:  A SURVEY OF HABENDUM CLAUSE  
CASES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES 
JESSICA E. MCDONALD AND ZACHARY M. WALLEN 
ABSTRACT 
 
As advances in drilling technology unlock previously inaccessible 
shale plays, developers seeking their share of the action may purchase 
existing oil and gas leases whose primary terms expired long ago.  While 
operators pay a premium for the deep rights associated with existing leases, 
such asset swaps also have the effect of removing from the equation the 
large up-front landowner bonuses and rentals commonly associated with 
new Marcellus and Utica leases.1  This has created considerable tension 
when landowners who discover that their property is, in fact, covered by an 
existing lease question whether an old lease is truly “held by production” 
(“HBP”).2  This paper provides a survey of the relevant case law on 
habendum clause interpretation throughout the United States in order to 
further clarify jurisdictional variations and identify the similarities that exist 
regionally and nationally.  It provides a look at how much production courts 
require to uphold an HBP lease and explains the tests the courts use to 
determine whether the required level of production occurred.  Throughout 
the case law on this issue runs a common theme:  courts must carefully 
balance lessors’ desire to benefit financially from the development of their 
property with operators’ interest in protecting their investments.  Given the 
variations in the law across the United States, developers must not only 
anticipate challenges to the HBP leases they buy, but they must also prepare 
themselves for different results depending on a particular court’s location, 
history, and jurisprudential precedents. 
 
 
  Jessica E. McDonald is of counsel and Zachary M. Wallen is an associate at Steptoe & 
Johnson PLLC in the firm’s Bridgeport, West Virginia office. Both authors would like to give a 
special thanks to Dominique N. Ranieri for her assistance with this article. 
1.  See, e.g., Michael Rubinkam, Lowball gas drill leases haunt Pa., ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 23, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/ap-enterprise-lowball-gas-drill-leases-haunt-pa-
190123364 html (discussing the wide variation in landowner royalty payments and describing 
instances of landowner dissatisfaction with older, less lucrative, oil and gas leases in the Marcellus 
Shale region).  See also T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261 (Pa. 2012). 
2.  See Rubinkam, supra note 1.  See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As advances in drilling technology unlock previously inaccessible 
shale plays through the United States, many oil and gas developers find 
themselves shifting their operations to areas of the country where they have 
never before operated.  Because much of the land overlying these deep 
shale plays remains subject to existing oil and gas leases,3 operators seeking 
entry into new frontiers often purchase rights to old leases whose primary 
terms expired decades ago.4  While the oil and gas owners will continue to 
receive royalties from these HBP leases, those royalties are often much 
lower than those of new leases.  These oil and gas owners also do not 
receive the large up-front bonuses and rentals commonly associated with 
new leases.5  Meanwhile, operators pay a premium for the deep rights 
associated with existing leases; as such, “held by production” leases are 
highly desirable commodities amongst industry players.  This tension 
makes the question of whether an old lease is truly “held by production” 
increasingly contentious.6 
Because of regional variations in judicial interpretation and precedent, 
developers may not be able to rely on the same arguments they used in the 
past in other states when faced with disputes over the validity of an older 
lease.  A new region may open an entirely new set of legal questions, even 
though actual operational processes remain largely the same.  Developers 
who purchase existing leases must therefore anticipate not only challenges 
to the HBP leases they buy, but also the possibility of different outcomes 
depending on where the presiding court sits. 
To truly understand what it means for a lease to be held by production, 
one must examine the construction of a typical oil and gas lease.7  The 
habendum clause in a standard lease contains not only a fixed (or primary) 
term, but also a secondary term.8  The secondary term often allows the lease 
 
3.  See generally Caleb A. Fielder, Marginal Wells and the Doctrine of Production in Paying 
Quantities, 57 LANDMAN MAG. 2 (2011).   
4.  For a more in-depth discussion of the issues concerning oil and gas leases that are 
purportedly held by production, see generally Timothy M. McKeen & Kristen L. Andrews, The 
Effect of Missing Production on Ohio’s Held by Production Oil and Gas Leases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 
FURTHERMORE 13 (2012). 
5.  See Rubinkam, supra note 1.  See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
6.  See Rubinkam, supra note 1.  See also Jedlicka, 42 A.3d at 264. 
7.  For a detailed discussion of the history and the evolution of the terms of the standard oil 
and gas lease, see PATRICK H. MARTIN AND BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND 
GAS LAW, § 601 (2012). 
8.  2 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE OF LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 26.1 (Rev. Ed. 2011); 
Fielder, supra note 3, at 1. 
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to continue in perpetuity as long as the developer produces oil or gas from 
the land.9  Particulars vary, but habendum clauses in most older leases 
allow the lease to continue beyond its primary term for “so long thereafter 
as oil or gas is ‘produced,’ or ‘produced in paying quantities,’ or ‘found,’ or 
‘found in paying quantities,’ or ‘discovered,’ or ‘discovered in paying 
quantities,’ or ‘can be produced,’ or ‘can be produced in paying 
quantities.’”10  While a layperson might interpret these phrases literally, the 
terms of the habendum clause “have come to be words of art in many 
jurisdictions, and such words are not necessarily given their literal 
meaning.”11  For example, in most jurisdictions across the country, courts 
require production in “paying quantities” even where that exact language is 
not used in the habendum clause.12 
This paper will provide a survey of the law on habendum clause 
interpretation across the United States.  We will examine the level of 
production that courts require to uphold a lease in its secondary term and 
the tests they employ to determine whether production from a particular 
leasehold meets their chosen standard.  The law on this issue is well 
developed in midcontinent states such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana, 
which have a long and fruitful history of oil and gas development.  This is 
also true in the eastern states that comprise the Marcellus and Utica Shale 
plays, where oil and gas has been produced since 1859, although much of 
the relevant case law in those jurisdictions is quite dated, leaving a level of 
uncertainty in how modern courts will interpret such decisions. 
On the other hand, many states throughout the country have only a few 
cases that discuss habendum clauses at all, and those cases may only 
address one narrow issue.  For those states, we have simply summarized the 
case law that exists, but we have not attempted to draw broad-scale 
conclusions as to the state’s position on habendum clauses generally.13  In 
order to make sense of a vast amount of law, we have grouped the case law 
into geographic regions.  This approach offers a look at the range of 
positions operators may face when moving into a particular operational 
area. 
 
9.  See KUNTZ, supra note 8, at §§ 26.1, 26.7.  See also Richard C. Maxwell, Oil and Gas 
Lessee’s Rights on Failure to Obtain Production During the Primary Term or to Maintain 
Production Thereafter, 3 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 6 (1957).  
10.  KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  We did not find any relevant case law in the following states:  Alaska, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
Whether a lease is deemed “held by production” often boils down to 
whether it produces in paying quantities.  Many courts imply a “paying 
quantities” requirement even when the lease does not expressly require it.  
Though most courts now agree that “production” means “production in 
paying quantities,” the case law on habendum clauses spans a spectrum of 
decisions that run the gamut from those that allowed a lease to continue 
where the lessee merely discovered oil and gas during the primary term to 
those that require that a well be capable of producing in paying quantities to 
those that mandate that the lessee actually produce, market, and sell the oil 
and gas.  In all these cases, courts attempt to strike a balance between 
protecting landowners’ interests in benefiting financially from the 
development of their property and allowing developers enough leeway in 
their operational decisions so that they will continue to invest in the 
exploration and development of oil and gas. 
On the question of just how much production or development must 
occur to extend a lease into its secondary term or hold it by production, 
courts in the Midcontinent generally fall into one of two positions.  One 
side favors a narrow interpretation of secondary term language that requires 
actual, physical production and marketing of oil and gas.14  Texas courts 
typically embrace this “actual production” approach.15  Supporters argue 
that the “actual production” interpretation discourages operators from using 
marginally producing wells to hold large tracts of land for speculative 
purposes and creates incentives to properly develop leased resources.16  The 
“capability rule” adopted by Oklahoma courts, on the other hand, focuses 
on the leasehold’s capability of production and does not require the lessee 
to actually sell oil and gas during the primary term in order to hold the 
lease.17  Proponents of this approach argue that giving the operator broad 
discretion to determine whether or not to continue operations on a particular 
leasehold “balances the equities between lessee and lessor” and avoids 
forfeitures by allowing companies that undertake expensive exploration the 
time and opportunity to recoup their costs.18 
 
14.  Ashleigh L. Boggs, Note, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson: Interpretation of Oil 
and Gas Lease Habendum Clauses in Texas and Why Oklahoma Should Maintain Its Divergent 
Approach to Keep Leases Alive, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 341, 342 (2008). 
15.  Id.  But see id. at 358 (discussing the nuances of the Texas Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the “capability rule”). 
16.  Id.  at 357.  See also Fielder, supra note 3, at 2. 
17.  Boggs, supra note 14, at 348 (discussing the interpretation of “production” by Oklahoma 
courts); Fielder, supra note 3, at 3. 
18.  Boggs, supra note 14, at 342.  See also Fielder, supra note 3, at 3. 
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Most courts concur that the lessee must produce some oil and gas from 
the land in order for a lease to continue beyond its primary term, but the 
meaning of the term “produced” varies between states.19  A few outlying 
states, such as West Virginia, Illinois and Kentucky, have taken a very 
operator-friendly approach in the past and allowed a lease to continue into 
its secondary term based upon the “mere discovery” of oil and gas during 
the primary term; however, more recent cases in those states show a shift 
toward requiring at least enough production to pay the lessor a royalty.20  
Courts now nearly universally agree that a well produces in “paying 
quantities” when it “pays a profit, even a small one, over the operating 
expenses.”21  But the tests used to determine whether profit exists, and the 
application of the results therefrom, vary across the country.22 
A. THE MIDCONTINENT 
Midcontinent courts have addressed the issues presented by the 
habendum clause many times over, thus creating a body of well-developed, 
nuanced case law. 
1. Texas 
While the Texas Supreme Court was not the first to address the 
question of whether “produced” means “produced in paying quantities,” 
other courts frequently cite its analysis of the issue in Garcia v. King as the 
basis of their interpretive reasoning.  The lease at issue in Garcia was “for a 
term of 10 years from this day (called primary term) and as long thereafter 
as oil, gas and other minerals is produced from said land hereunder.”23  At 
the end of the primary term, the lease was producing about twenty-four 
barrels of oil per month, which, while “susceptible of division . . . was 
insufficient to yield a profit over and above operating and marketing 
expenses” and “was barely adequate to pay for his labor in operating the 
 
19.  KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5.  Courts within the Appalachian region have held 
“production” to mean the capability of production, rather than actual physical production in 
paying quantities.  See discussion infra Part II(B). 
20.  KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.5. 
21.  Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899); Maxwell, supra note 9, at 10.  See 
also Parks v. Sinai Oil Co., 201 P. 517, 518 (Okla. 1921); Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 510 
(Tex. 1942); KUNTZ, supra note 9, at § 26.7(d). 
22.  KUNTZ, supra note 8, at § 26.7.  This is not as applicable in the Appalachian region, 
where courts have strictly relied on the good-faith determination of the lessee as the test for 
whether a given lease has produced in paying quantities, as opposed to the various jurisdictions of 
the Midcontinent, where some states rely on the same good-faith test, while others also rely on an 
arithmetic component to determine whether production in paying quantities has occurred.  See 
discussion infra Part II(B). 
23.  Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 510 (explanatory parenthetical in original text). 
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wells.”24  After receiving about eight cents per day as lease royalty during 
the primary term, the lessors sued the lessees to cancel the lease.25 
At trial, the court found that the lease expired on its terms because 
“neither oil nor gas was being ‘produced,’ within the meaning of the 
lease.”26  The court of appeals reversed, holding “that it was an error to 
construe the word ‘produce’ as to require production in paying 
quantities.”27  The Texas Supreme Court then had to determine whether the 
term “produced,” when used in a habendum clause, required production “in 
paying quantities.”28 
The court examined a series of holdings from jurisdictions that had 
previously addressed the issue and found only two cases in which courts 
indicated that “produced” may not mean “produced in paying quantities.”29  
The Supreme Court of Illinois rendered one of these decisions in 1913 in 
Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Company, where the court adhered to the strict letter 
of the lease and declined to imply a paying quantities requirement.30  The 
Texas Supreme Court quickly dismissed this case as having been decided 
“before the oil industry had been fully developed.”31 
The following dicta, taken from a case decided by the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky, also appeared to suggest that a “paying quantities” 
requirement should not be implied: 
It will be observed that the lessee is not required to produce oil in 
paying quantities, but he is required to produce oil or gas one or 
the other, from the premises.  This, of course, means a production 
of oil or gas in such quantities as to be susceptible of division, so 
as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small.  A mere 
showing of oil manifestly is not sufficient, even though produced.  
 
24.  Id.  
25.  Id.  
26.  Id.  
27.  King v. Garcia, 152 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (“To hold that the word 
‘produced’ as used in the Habendum clause of the lease here involved is synonymous with the 
phrase ‘produced in paying quantities,’ would be substituting a limitation upon the determinable 
fee which is different in legal effect from the limitation agreed upon by the parties.  It would 
amount to an overriding by implication of the intention of the parties expressed in a binding 
contract.”). 
28.  Id. 
29.  Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 510-11.   
30.  Id. at 511(citing Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 102 N.E. 1043, 1044 (Ill. 1913)).  For a 
detailed discussion of the Gillespie decision, see our Illinois section, discussion infra Part II(C)(1). 
31.  Id. 
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The production must be tangible and substantial, but it need not be 
great.32 
Despite this statement, however, the well at issue in that particular case 
produced “only a mere scum of oil, and the court held that this was 
insufficient to keep the contract in force.”33  Noting that the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky’s ultimate holding in the case did not turn on its sentiment that 
production in paying quantities was unnecessary, the Texas Supreme Court 
also declined to rely on that case.34 
Finding that the weight of authority supported the plaintiffs’ position 
that production must be in paying quantities, the court also noted the 
importance of marketing the product, stating:  “[t]he term ‘paying 
quantities’ involves not only the amount of production, but also the ability 
to market the product at a profit.”35  Returning to the lease at issue, the 
court pointed out that all of the producing wells on the property, when taken 
together, failed to produce enough to pay a profit over operating costs when 
the primary term ended.36  Accordingly, the court held that “the object 
sought to be accomplished by the continuation” of the lease “had ceased, 
and the lease had terminated.”37 
The Texas Supreme Court expanded on the requirement of production 
in paying quantities in Clifton v. Koontz by creating an explicit two-step 
approach to determine whether a lease produces in paying quantities.38  The 
court’s objective two-prong test requires courts to first calculate profits and 
losses over a reasonable time period.  If the lessee’s activities fail to yield a 
profit over operating expenses and a net loss occurs, the court must then 
determine whether a reasonable and prudent operator would continue 
operating the well under the circumstances.39 
The operative fact pattern in Clifton was that the oil and gas owner, 
Clifton, sought to cancel the lease on her land by arguing it terminated due 
to cessation of production in paying quantities.40  She argued that the lease 
failed to produce in paying quantities after sustaining a loss for two 
consecutive months.41  The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
 
32.  Id. (quoting Enfield v. Woods, 248 S.W. 842 (Ky. 1923)).  We discuss the quoted 
Enfield decision more particularly in the Kentucky section, discussion infra Part II(B)(3). 
33.  Garcia, 164 S.W.2d at 511. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. at 512. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 513. 
38.  325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959). 
39.  Id. (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1942)). 
40.  Id. at 687. 
41.  Id. at 688-89. 
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explaining that “there can be no arbitrary period for determining the 
question of whether or not a lease has terminated.”42 
Clifton offered evidence that for the “period of time from June 1955 
through September 1956, the income from the lease was $3,250.00 and that 
the total expense of operations during the same period was $3,466.16—
thus, a loss of $ 216.16 for the sixteen months’ period.”43  The court 
questioned the time period Clifton used to calculate lease profits derived 
from the marginal well.  Because the lessee began reworking the well on 
September 12, 1956, the court pointed out that “the evidence that there was 
a small operating loss for the period of time from July 1956 through 
September 1956 is not controlling in determining whether or not there had 
been a cessation of production in paying quantities through July 12, 1956, a 
date 60 days prior to the beginning of reworking operations.”44  The court 
instead focused on the profits and losses prior to the time the sixty-day 
period set forth in the cessation of production clause took effect, which 
occurred before July 12, 1956.45  Using month-by-month figures, the court 
determined that during the relevant period, beginning in June 1955 and 
continuing through July 12, 1956, the lessee operated at a profit of 
$111.25.46 
When confronted with a marginal well, the court explained: 
[T]he standard by which paying quantities is determined is 
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably 
prudent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not 
merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the manner in 
which the well in question was operated.47   
Therefore, the court concluded: 
In determining paying quantities . . . the trial court necessarily 
must take into consideration all matters which would 
influence a reasonable and prudent operator.  Some of the 
factors are:  The depletion of the reservoir and the price for 
which the lessee is able to sell his produce, the relative 
profitableness of other wells in the area, the operating and 
marketing costs of the lease, his net profit, the lease 
 
42.  Id. at 690.  This has later been construed by Texas courts to be “a reasonable period of 
time based on the facts of the case; courts have used time periods as brief as six months or as long 
as two years.”  Fielder, supra note 3, at 3. 
43.  Clifton, 325 S.W.2d at 689. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. at 691. 
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provisions, a reasonable period of time under the 
circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is holding the 
lease merely for speculative purposes.48 
In short, the court explained: 
Whether there is a reasonable basis for the expectation of 
profitable returns from the well is the test.  If the quantity 
be sufficient to warrant the use of the gas in the market, 
and the income therefrom is in excess of the actual 
marketing cost, and operating costs, the production 
satisfies the term “in paying quantities.”49 
This standard allows operations to continue in certain cases, “even 
though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the 
undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.”50  The 
court explained that: 
The underlying reason for this definition appears to be that when a 
lessee is making a profit over the actual cash he must expend to 
produce the lease, he is entitled to continue operating in order to 
recover the expense of drilling and equipping, although he may 
never make a profit on the over-all operation.51 
Recognizing such principles, the court rejected Clifton’s contention 
that the profit and loss figures should include depreciation of the original 
investment cost as an operating expense, explaining that “[d]epreciation is 
nothing more than an accounting charge of money spent in purchasing 
tangible property, and if the investment itself is not to be considered, as is 
held by this Court, then neither is depreciation.”52  Finding that the 
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was production in 
paying quantities, as well as marketing facilities and the actual sale of gas at 
a profit, the court held that the lease had not terminated.53 
The Texas Supreme Court further explained its position on marketing 
in its 1960 decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Reid.54  In that case, the lessee 
began drilling just a few days before the end of the five-year primary term 
and finally completed the well after the primary term had ended.55  While 
 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 692. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. at 691.  The court also discussed several other arguments presented by the petitioners 
involving breach of the implied covenant to develop and to explore. 
54.  337 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1960). 
55.  Id. at 268. 
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the well was clearly capable of production, Gulf Oil capped it (essentially 
“turning off” production temporarily) due to a lack of marketing facilities.56  
Approximately a month later, the lessee tendered a shut-in royalty payment 
that the lessor rejected.57  Four months later, the lessee contracted with a 
pipeline company to sell the gas, and the well produced in paying quantities 
until the lessor sued to cancel the lease.58 
The court defined the main issue before it as “whether the so-called 
‘shut-in’ royalty payment, tendered after a well capable of producing gas 
only in paying quantities had been capped, was so timely made as to extend 
the term of an oil and gas lease after the expiration of the primary term.”59  
Citing Garcia, the court held: 
[T]he word “production” as used in the habendum clause of this 
lease is equivalent to the phrase “production in paying quantities.”  
The term “paying quantities” embraces not only the amount of 
production, but also the ability to market the product at a profit. 
Garcia et al v. King et al, 139 Texas 578, 164 S.W. 2d 509, 512.  
As said in that case, “the object of the contract was to secure the 
development of the property for the mutual benefit of the parties.  
It was contemplated that this would be done during the primary 
term of the contract.”  To this sentence we might add the phrase, 
“or during the extension of the lease term.”  Thus, no matter how 
great the potential production may be or how many million cubic 
feet of gas may have been flared, there would be no production or 
production in paying quantities unless there was an available 
market . . .  the fact that there is no available market is not an 
excuse for failure to produce, and the lease terminates unless some 
other provision will keep it in force.60 
Even after capping its well, Gulf Oil actively negotiated with the 
pipeline company to find a market for its product, but it did not conduct 
“any manual operations” until after it entered into the pipeline contract five 
months after completing the well.61  While the trial court found that Gulf 
Oil acted diligently in seeking a market, the Texas Supreme Court 
disagreed: 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 269-70 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W. 2d 509, 512 (1942)). 
61.  Id. at 272. 
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To sum up, there was no production from the well during the term 
of the lease as extended by drilling operations; the ‘shut-in’ royalty 
was not paid so as to bring about constructive or contractual 
production, and no provisions of the lease can be construed to 
furnish a further extension of the primary term or to make the 
tender of royalty in this case timely.62 
Therefore, the court concluded that the lease terminated. 63 
In Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, the Texas Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of temporary cessations of production within the 
framework of the actual production doctrine.64  The lease in this case stated 
that the lease “shall remain in force for a term of one (1) year and as long 
thereafter as gas is or can be produced,” and it also provided that “if 
production ceases for any reason, the lease ‘shall not terminate provided 
lessee resumes operations for drilling a well within sixty (60) days from 
such cessation.’”65  Production first began in 1936, but it “totally ceased for 
sixty-one days in 1981 and ninety-one days in 1985 while the gas purchaser 
conducted pipeline repairs.  In 1997, Thompson sued for declaration that 
the lease terminated when production ceased in 1981 and for conversion of 
damages.”66  The trial court ruled in favor of the landowner, Thompson, 
finding that the lease terminated due to cessation of production.67  On 
appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the 
lease’s habendum clause required “actual production in paying 
quantities . . . [and] that the lease terminated when actual production ceased 
longer than sixty days.”68 
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Anadarko argued that “the habendum 
clause’s plain language allows production or the capability of production to 
sustain the lease” and that “the cessation-of-production clause only applies 
if the well holding the lease becomes incapable of production.”69  
Thompson maintained that the “cessation-of-production clause applies 
whenever actual production ceases rather than when actual production and 
capability of production cease . . . [and that] allowing the capability of 
production to sustain the lease indefinitely would render the cessation-of-
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002). 
65.  Id. at 553. 
66.  Id.  
67.  Id.  
68.  Id. at 553-54. 
69.  Id. at 555 (emphasis in original text). 
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production clause meaningless.”70  The Texas Supreme Court rejected 
Thompson’s contention, stating that “the implied duty to manage and 
administer the lease as a reasonably prudent operator, which encompasses 
the implied duty to market the gas reasonably, would limit the lessees’ 
ability to sustain the lease based on a well’s capability of production.”71  
Once it deemed actual production unnecessary to hold the lease so long as 
the well remained capable of production, the court defined the phrase 
“capable of production in paying quantities” as “a well that will produce in 
paying quantities if the well is turned ‘on,’ and it begins flowing, without 
additional equipment or repair.”72 
This body of Texas case law is one of the most developed in the 
country and serves as an important resource for courts deciding similar 
cases in areas where the law is less developed.  While Texas courts appear 
to require more from developers than most other jurisdictions, their 
decisions seem motivated by a desire to promote actual, lucrative 
development.  
2. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma has its own well-developed case law on habendum clauses 
that focuses on the capability of production.  The Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma first adopted its “capability rule” in 1958 in McVicker v. Horn, 
Robinson & Nathan, where it declined to imply a duty to market oil and gas 
during the primary term when the well was readily shown to be capable of 
production.73  The habendum clause at issue in this case allowed the lessee 
to continue operating “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is 
produced from said lands by the lessee.”74  Although the lessee completed a 
well five months before the end of the primary term, it neither sold nor 
marketed any gas from it because the lessor refused to allow the lessee to 
connect the well to a prospective purchaser’s pipeline.75  The lessee 
 
70.  Id. (emphasis in original text). 
71.  Id. at 557. 
72.  Id. at 558 (quoting Hyrdocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 N.W.2d 
427, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993)).  
73.  322 P.2d 410, 412 (Okla. 1958).  See also Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, 869 P.2d 323, 327 
(Okla. 1994) (“The Court then rejected the lessors’ argument that production in paying quantities 
required the lessees to not only complete a well capable of producing in paying quantities but also 
remove the product from the ground and market it.  Thus, where a well was completed and 
capable of producing in paying quantities within the primary term, the lease continued, so far as 
the habendum clause was concerned, as long as the well remained capable of producing in paying 
quantities, regardless of any marketing of the product.”). 
74.  McVicker, 322 P.2d at 412. 
75.  Id. at 411-12. 
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maintained that it could produce gas from the well, but had shut it in rather 
than let it waste the gas into the air.76 
In resolving this issue, the court cited a 1952 Kansas case, Tate v. 
Stanolind Oil & Gas Company, which stated: 
The great weight of authority, however, appears to be in harmony 
with the view that actual production during the primary term is 
essential to the extension of the lease beyond that fixed term.  
This, at least, is true unless the lease contains some additional 
provisions indicating an intent to extend the right to produce 
beyond the primary term.77 
The court then explained: 
No valid fault can be found with the above statement, but was 
[sic] say it applies only to production, per se, and as that word 
is ordinarily defined (not including marketing).  To say that 
marketing during the primary term of the lease is essential to 
its extension beyond said term, unless the lease contains 
additional provisions indicating a contrary intent, is to not 
only ignore the distinction between producing and marketing, 
which inheres in the nature of the oil and gas business, but it 
also ignores the difference between express and implied terms 
in lease contracts.78 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma therefore held that the lease did not 
terminate for failure to immediately market the gas and that the lessee had a 
“reasonable time” in which to do so.79 
Next, the court engaged in a detailed examination of the facts, 
including the amount of pressure in the well compared to that in a nearby 
pipeline and the particulars surrounding the lessee’s efforts to find a buyer 
for the gas.80  Finding that the lessee behaved as a prudent operator in light 
of the circumstances, the court upheld the lease.81  The court noted, 
however, that even the most diligent efforts cannot save a lease “where 
there is no reasonable probability that [those efforts] will be successful, or it 
appears that others, with less effort, would succeed where they have 
failed.”82 
 
76.  Id. at 413. 
77.  240 P.2d 465, 468-69 (Kan. 1952) (emphasis added). 
78.  McVicker, 322 P.2d at 413 (emphasis in original text). 
79.  Id. at 414. 
80.  Id. at 414-16. 
81.  Id. at 417. 
82.  Id. at 416. 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has further refined this rule in 
subsequent cases, and it remains good law.83  For example, in the 1994 case 
of Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals, the court again upheld the rule promulgated 
in prior cases that “where a well was completed and capable of producing in 
paying quantities within the primary term, the lease continued, so far as the 
habendum clause was concerned, as long as the well remained capable of 
producing in paying quantities, regardless of any marketing of the 
product.”84  In Mason v. Ladd Petroleum, the court examined in detail the 
expenses to be deducted from production proceeds when determining 
whether a well produced in paying quantities.85  The plaintiffs in that case 
contended that the lease on their land expired because the well holding it no 
longer produced in paying quantities.86  The habendum clauses at issue 
allowed the leases to remain in force “for as long as oil or gas is 
produced.”87  Citing its prior decision in Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 
the court noted that the term “produced,” when used in a habendum clause, 
“denotes in law production in paying quantities . . . [and] means that the 
lessee must produce in quantities sufficient to yield a return, however small, 
in excess of ‘lifting expenses,’ even though well drilling and completion 
costs might never be repaid.”88 
Explaining that only expenses directly related to lifting or producing 
operations can be offset against production proceeds, the court noted that 
these expenses can include the “costs of operating the pumps, pumpers’ 
salaries, costs of supervision, gross production taxes, royalties payable to 
the lessor, electricity, telephone services, repairs.”89  On the other hand, the 
court held that such expenses associated with operating a district office, 
administrative overhead, and depreciation of items such as casing, tubing, 
and a Christmas tree were not relevant to the calculation of lifting 
expenses.90  Finding that proceeds exceeded lifting expenses, the court held 
the leases at issue remained valid.91 
 
83.  For discussion of these subsequent cases, see Boggs, supra note 14, at 350. 
84.  869 P.2d 323, 326 (Okla. 1994). 
85.  630 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Okla. 1981). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. (quoting Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854 (Okla. 1979)). 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 1286. 
91.  Id. 
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3. Kansas 
As seen in the Tate case cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kansas 
courts require “actual production during the primary term as distinct from 
mere exploration or discovery of oil during such term.”92  Kansas courts 
also use an objective, mathematical computation to determine when a lease 
produces in paying quantities.  
In a 1976 decision, the Kansas Supreme Court specifically rejected a 
paying quantities analysis based entirely on the lessee’s good-faith 
judgment and held that a habendum clause that allowed the lease to 
continue “as much longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities” 
required “production in paying quantities.”93  Faced with a lease that 
produced steadily from 1916 to 1971, after which the only production 
consisted of “free flow” from lines running between eight wells on the 
property and a lease tank battery, the court discussed both the subjective 
and objective standards of determining how much production is enough.94  
It pointed out that many states choose the subjective standard that leaves 
this determination solely to the judgment of a reasonably prudent operator 
because of a belief that a lessee’s self-interest prevents it from continuing to 
operate at a loss.95  However, that test does not protect against the lessee 
who wants to preserve his interest in hopes of future discoveries in other 
formations or an upturn in market conditions.96  The court explained its 
belief that the better approach is to follow those cases that apply an 
objective, mathematical computation, which offers the lessor “some 
protection when the burdens of the lease far exceed the meager royalty 
payments, when they fall below the customary delay rental.”97  After 
finding that normal operating costs, in addition to those specifically 
required by statute—which included restoring the surface around and 
plugging abandoned wells within six months—far outweighed the gross 
income from the lease at issue, the court held that the lease expired on its 
terms.98 
 
92.  Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 240 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. 1952). 
93.  Reese Enter., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 896-97 (Kan. 1976). 
94.  Id. at 897. 
95.  Id. (citing 2 KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, §§ 26.7(e), (f), & (g) 
(1964)).  
96.  Id.  
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 899.  
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4. Louisiana 
Louisiana law requires actual production within the primary term to 
avoid termination, and the mere existence of a well that is capable of 
producing will not save the lease.99  Two older cases illustrate this position, 
which has since been codified by the Louisiana Mineral Code.  Prior to the 
1974 enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code, Louisiana courts used a 
two-prong test to determine whether production from a lease was 
adequate.100  Under that test, the courts compared the amount of royalties 
being paid to the lessor to the size of other payments due under the lease, 
including bonuses, delay rentals, and shut-in royalties.  They conducted this 
comparison in order to determine whether the royalties constituted “serious 
consideration” for the maintenance of the lease—an analysis referred to as 
the “objective” standard.”101 
In Green v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, the defendant lessee drilled 
only one well on the land, which produced so little oil that it normally 
would have been abandoned.102  Yet, because the company also operated 
other wells in the area, its employees could service the poorly producing 
well at little additional cost.103  Standard Oil contended that because it could 
produce some quantity of oil from the well without incurring additional 
expenses, it should be allowed to do so.104  Citing the company’s stated 
intention not to develop the lease any further, the court stated that the lessee 
“must either develop with reasonable diligence, or else give up the 
lease.”105  The court declared the lease void because the lessee had 
“manifestly defaulted on its contract.”106 
A similar factual situation gave rise to the dispute in another Louisiana 
case, Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co.107  In that case, the lessee moved drilling 
machinery onto the property on the very last day of the primary term but 
did not actually drill a well until after the primary term expired.108  Once 
drilled, the well produced very little.109  Much like in Green, the defendant 
 
99.  John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the New Louisiana 
Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 800 (1976). 
100.  See generally Noel Estate, Inc., v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Brown v. Sugar 
Creek Syndicate, 197 So. 583 (La. 1940); Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., Inc., 180 So. 473 (La. 1938). 
101.  Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in ‘Paying Quantities’—A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REV. 
635, 638-43 (2005); McCollam, supra note 98, at 814. 
102.  84 So. 211, 212 (La. 1920).   
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  108 So. 314 (La. 1926). 
108.  Id. at 314. 
109.  Id. 
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lessee derived a small profit from the well solely because its other wells in 
the vicinity allowed it to service the subject well at little cost.110  The lessee 
argued that its ability to derive a small profit from the well relieved it of its 
obligation to further develop the property and consequently allowed it to 
hold the lease.111  The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and cancelled 
the lease; the court rested its conclusion on the fact that the lessee failed to 
comply with the lease’s express terms and did not drill a well within one 
year.112 
After the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Greene and Caldwell, 
Louisiana enacted a statute based largely on the Texas Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Clifton v. Koontz, which essentially codified existing Louisiana 
common law.113  The relevant section of the Louisiana Mineral Code states: 
When a mineral lease is being maintained by production of oil or 
gas, the production must be in paying quantities.  It is considered 
to be in paying quantities when production allocable to the total 
original right of the lessee to share in production under the lease is 
sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent operator to continue 
production in an effort to secure a return on his investment or to 
minimize any loss.114 
The philosophy that a lessee should not be allowed to selfishly hold a 
lease for speculative purposes is inherent in this law.115  While Louisiana 
courts may still consider lease payment information, the current statutory 
scheme specifically limits its use: 
[T]he amount of the royalties being paid may be considered only 
insofar as it may show the reasonableness of the lessee’s 
expectation in continuing production.  The amount need not be a 
serious or adequate equivalent for continuance of the lease as 
compared with the amount of the bonus, rentals, or other sums 
paid to the lessor. 116 
As a result, Louisiana courts now employ the same reasonable and 
prudent operator test used in Texas.117 
 
110.  Id. at 315. 
111.  Id. at 316. 
112.  Id.  
113.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 (1974); Ottinger, supra note 100, at 657; 
McCollam, supra note 98, at 814. 
114.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 (2012).  This section took effect on January 1, 1975. 
115.  Ottinger, supra note 100, at 637. 
116.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:125 (2012); see also McCollam, supra note 98, at 814. 
117.  Ottinger, supra note 100, at 657; McCollam, supra note 98, at 814. 
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5. Alabama 
Alabama has less reported case law on habendum clauses than its 
neighbors, but it does have an interesting case involving cessation of 
production in the secondary term of a lease.  In Griffin v. Crutcher-Tufts 
Corp., the lessors granted a lease for a term of five years beginning on 
January 15, 1975.118  The lessee unitized a portion of the leased acreage and 
drilled a productive well in the unit, which produced until December 1979. 
Just two weeks before the end of the primary term, on January 2, 1980, the 
lessee shut down the well and began “workover” operations.119  These 
operations proved unsuccessful, and the lessee abandoned the well on April 
10, 1980 and began drilling a new well a month later in another location 
within the unit.120  The second well was successful and continued 
producing.121  Nonetheless, in September 1980, the lessors notified the 
lessee that they considered the lease to have expired, and in September 
1981, they filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare 
that the lessees could not continue to hold the lease.122 
At issue before the court was the drilling operations clause contained in 
the lease, which provided that the lease would not terminate upon the 
cessation of production after the discovery of oil or gas, so long as the 
lessee commenced “additional drilling or reworking operations within 60 
days.”123  The clause further provided that even if there was no production 
at the end of the primary term, the lease could still be held if the lessee was 
engaged in drilling or reworking operations when the term expired, so long 
as the period of cessation did not exceed sixty days.124  The lessors 
contended that the clause did not save the lease because the productive well 
was the second well drilled and not the well the lessee attempted to rework 
just before the end of the primary term.125 
The court noted that the production needed to preserve a lease under a 
drilling operations clause must be obtained from the “particular drilling 
operations alleged to satisfy the clause.”126  The court also rejected the 
defendants’ contention that the shut-in royalties it paid extended the lease 
since the shut-in clause specifically stated that it applied during the primary 
 
118.  500 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. 1986). 
119.  Id.  
120.  Id. 
121.  Id.  
122.  Id.  
123.  Id.  
124.  Id. at 1010. 
125.  Id.  
126.  Id.  
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term.127  Since the gas well at issue was “clearly not capable of production 
in commercial quantities,” the court held the lease expired once the 
defendants abandoned the first well.128 
6. Arkansas 
In 1986, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether an oil and gas lease should be cancelled for failure to produce in 
paying quantities.  In Turner v. Reynolds Metals Co., Jean Turner leased her 
land in 1951 for a term of ten years and “thereafter as long as oil, gas or 
other minerals were produced from the land.”129  In 1975, the parties agreed 
to extend the lease for an additional period, with both a new primary and 
secondary term.130  Having presented evidence of the revenue produced and 
the quite limited royalties paid on the lease from 1975 through 1982, lessor 
Turner argued that the lease automatically terminated at the end of the 
extended secondary term because the well had not produced gas in paying 
quantities.131  As a threshold matter, the court stated that a provision in a 
lease that requires “production” means “production in paying quantities.”132  
The court considered the expense the lessee paid each month to service the 
ten wells in the field area where the subject well was located, allocated a 
share of that expense to each well, and determined that the lessee lost 
money on the well at issue every year during the secondary term.133  
Dismissing the fact that the landowner received free gas for her home 
during this period as irrelevant, the court held that she was entitled to cancel 
the lease since it had failed to produce in paying quantities.134 
In another case, Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc.,, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas considered how much production amounts to 
“commercial paying quantities,” which the court said “is determined by 
what is profitable to the lessee.”135  In this case, one working interest owner 
assigned rights to another after the well holding the lease had been shut in 
for several months.136  The assignee, Ross, contended the lease remained in 
 
127.  Id. at 1011. 
128.  Id. at 1012. 
129.  721 S.W.2d 626, 626 (Ark. 1986). 
130.  Id. at 627.  The term of this supplemental agreement was “for a period of at least five 
years from this date and beyond said five year period for as long as oil and/or gas is produced 
from the leased lands or lands unitized therewith.” Id. 
131.  Id.  
132.  Id.  
133.  Id.  
134.  Id. at 628. 
135.  8 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Ark. 2000). 
136.  Id. at 513. 
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effect, while Freedom Energy, who had meanwhile taken an option to 
purchase leases from the lessors, argued the lease expired prior to the Ross 
assignment.137  At trial, the court considered evidence for a twenty-four 
month period, during which the well operated profitably for eight months 
and at a loss for sixteen months, with a net loss of approximately 
$607.00.138 
On appeal, Ross argued that Freedom Energy failed to meet its burden 
of showing the lease ceased to produce in commercial paying quantities 
because it improperly included overhead as a cost and that the court erred 
by adding non-lifting costs.139  As to the question of what costs ought to be 
considered, the court declared that only direct expenses attributable to 
operation were relevant, excluding costs such as overhead and those of 
drilling and equipping the well.140  The court also rejected Ross’s claim that 
the two-year production period the court examined was too short, holding 
that the relevant time period is a reasonable one in light of the 
circumstances.141  The fact that Ross’s predecessor voluntarily ceased 
production four months before assigning the well to Ross offered further 
support to the trial court’s finding that the well ceased to produce in the 
required quantities, which was affirmed in the Arkansas Supreme Court 
decision.142 
7. Mississippi 
We found no cases in Mississippi that specifically addressed the 
question of what level of production must exist to hold a lease in its 
secondary term.  A 1959 case, however, took an atypical, plain meaning 
approach to the interpretation of the word “production.”  In Roberts v. 
Corum, the lease at question was “for a term of ten (10) years from [the date 
of the lease] (called ‘primary term’) and as long thereafter as oil, gas or 
other mineral is produced from said land or lands with which said land is 
pooled hereunder.”143  The Mississippi Supreme Court declined to hold that 
the production requirement meant production in “paying quantities.”144  
Instead of engaging in the typical jurisprudential analysis of production 
implying production in paying quantities, the court held that “it is sounder 
 
137.  Id.  
138.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 514. 
140.  Id. at 514-15. 
141.  Id. at 516. 
142.  Id. at 516-17. 
143.  112 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1959) (explanatory parenthetical in original text). 
144.  Id. at 554. 
            
404 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:383 
policy to adhere to the principles so deeply embedded in our jurisprudence 
that the plain and unambiguous language of a contract should be construed 
as written.”145  To the court, it could not “now write into that contract the 
words ‘production in paying quantities’ without doing violence to the 
solemn rights of the parties to make their own agreements.”146  There is 
additional case law on record in Mississippi that clearly allows for some 
cessation of production in the secondary term so long as the temporary 
stoppage is not for an unreasonable period of time.147 
8. Nebraska 
In Long v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., the lessors sought the surrender of 
a lease due to the failure of the defendant to produce oil and gas in paying 
quantities during the primary term of the lease.148  The lease had a standard 
term, but also had an additional section that provided “if, after discovery of 
oil, liquid hydrocarbons, gas or their respective constituent products, or any 
of them, the production thereof should cease, this lease shall not terminate 
if lessee commences additional drilling or reworking operations.”149  The 
lessor contended that the word “production,” as used in that clause or 
anywhere it existed in the lease, meant “production in paying quantities.”150  
The court cited multiple cases where courts addressed the question of 
whether to imply a “paying quantities” requirement where one was not 
specifically stated, including Garcia v. King, but noted that none of those 
cases related to the primary term of the lease.151  This case, therefore, did 
not turn on the meaning of “paying quantities” because the dispute occurred 
while the lease was still in its primary term.  However, the court’s lengthy 
discussion of the Garcia case may be read as an indicator of its position on 
the question as it pertains to the secondary term.  Yet, at the same time, the 
court also noted that “courts are not at liberty to rewrite the contract made 
by the parties, nor should the courts add language to that used by the parties 
and thus change the plain expressed intention of the parties as set out in the 
contract.”152  Therefore, how a Nebraska court might come down on a case 
 
145.  Id. at 555.  Without directly citing to case law, the court prefaced that holding by 
stating that it was “cognizant of the fact that many courts hold to the contrary” concerning the 
meaning of the word “production.”  Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 762 (Miss. 1960). 
148. 89 N.W.2d 245, 248-49 (Neb. 1958). 
149. Id. at 252. 
150. Id. at 254. 
151. Id. at 255 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942)). 
152. Id. 
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centering on habendum clause interpretation remains left open to 
interpretation. 
B. EASTERN STATES 
While courts in the east calculate a lessee’s profits and losses the same 
way as those in the Midcontinent, they ultimately defer to the good-faith 
determination of the lessee as to whether continued operations are justified. 
1. Pennsylvania 
With one of the longest histories of commercial oil and gas 
development in the world,153 it is no surprise that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was the first to tackle the paying quantities question.  The “good-
faith” test first introduced in the 1899 case of Young v. Forest Oil Co. set a 
definitional standard for what constitutes paying quantities—that a well 
must produce some amount of oil or gas greater than the amount needed to 
cover operating costs—and offered a method for determining whether that 
standard was met.154  The resulting lessee-centered focus on good faith 
became the basis for oil and gas drilling regimes throughout the 
Appalachian basin and remains good law today. 
In Young, the landowner filed suit after the lessee refused to drill 
additional wells on his land and asked the court to either declare “a 
forfeiture of the lease for failure to develop the land” or to require the lessee 
to sink an additional well on his property.155  Although the lessee drilled a 
total of five wells on Young’s fifty-three acre farm, four of which produced 
oil, Young focused on the area of the farm containing no wells to support 
his argument that “oil was no longer produced ‘in paying quantities.’”156 
The court declared the “real question” in the case was whether the 
lessee’s “omission to put a well in that portion of the land was fraudulent,” 
but it found “not a scintilla of evidence” to support that contention.157  A 
 
153.  The first American commercial oil well was the famous Drake Well, drilled pursuant to 
a lease dated December 30, 1857.  WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, at § 601.1.  The 
surrounding Oil Creek valley was the world’s largest oil producer from 1859 through 1873.  
154.  45 A. 121, 122-23 (Pa. 1899).  In another section of the opinion, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the fact that since: 
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has put his money and 
labor into the undertaking . . . [he] is entitled to follow his own judgment.  If that is 
exercised in good faith, a different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or 
all combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree interfering with 
him. 
Id. at 122. 
155.  Id. at 121. 
156.  Id. at 122. 
157.  Id.  
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well produces in paying quantities, the court explained, if it “pays a profit, 
even a small one, over the operating expenses,” even though it “may never 
repay its cost, and the operation as a whole may result in a loss.”158  Noting 
that the lessee must be allowed to reduce its loss by profits, however small, 
the court found the lease valid, holding that “the phrase, ‘paying quantities,’ 
therefore is to be construed with reference to the operator, and by his 
judgment when exercised in good faith.”159 
In the 1977 case of Pemco Gas, Inc. v. Bernardi, the Armstrong 
County Court of Common Pleas interpreted a habendum clause that allowed 
a lease to continue for “as long after commencement of operations as said 
land is operated for the exploration or production of gas and oil, or as gas 
and oil is found in paying quantities thereon.”160  Although the analysis in 
Pemco focuses largely on “commencement of operations” language 
particular to that lease and is not binding law, we include it here because it 
shows a tendency for courts to allow a lessee to proceed when the court 
believes the leasehold is capable of producing. 
The original lessee assigned the subject lease to Pemco, a third-party 
operator, about six months prior to the expiration of the ten-year primary 
term.161  Pemco then surveyed the site, began negotiating with the lessors 
and a neighbor about the location of the well site and rights of way, and 
hired third parties to excavate and drill the well.162  Just days before the 
expiration of the primary term, workers cleared the property and brought 
several pieces of conductor pipe to the site.163  Delays at another site 
prevented the drill rig from arriving until September 1, the day the primary 
term expired.164  That very day, the lessors executed a new lease on the 
property with a different oil and gas firm and informed Pemco that they 
believed the prior lease had terminated.165 
The court divided its analysis into two issues.  First, what types of acts 
qualify as the “commencement of operations?”  And second, did the lessee 
commence operations with the good-faith intent to drill a well?166  Noting 
that Pemco began negotiations nearly three months before the expiration of 
the lease and continued its preparations until the last day of the lease, the 
court determined that Pemco “commenced operations within the generally 
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accepted meaning of that phrase.”167  The court explained, “if a lessee 
commences a well within the primary term of a lease and carries on the 
drilling operations diligently and in good faith, although he does not 
actually complete the well and secure production until after the end of the 
primary term, the lease remains in force . . . . “168  Describing the law on the 
issue of what constitutes “commencement of operations” as fairly clear, the 
court noted that “actual drilling is not necessary” and “physical acts 
normally required to be done prior to the commencement of actual drilling, 
if done in good faith, are sufficient to constitute the commencement of a 
well or drilling operations.”169  Finding no evidence of bad faith, the court 
held that the lease continued into its secondary term as a result of Pemco’s 
“good faith commencement of operations in preparation for the actual 
drilling of a gas well.”170 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 
reaffirmed and expanded upon the subjective, good-faith test first 
promulgated in Young v. Forest Oil and specifically declined to adopt the 
objective standard employed by Texas and other midcontinent courts.  In 
T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, two lessees filed a declaratory 
judgment action against landowner Ann Jedlicka when she objected to their 
plans to drill four additional wells on her land.171  Jedlicka acquired her 
seventy-acre tract of land in 1979, subject to the terms of an existing 1928 
oil and gas lease.172  The lease’s habendum clause allowed the lessee to 
continue operating “for a term of two years, and as long thereafter as oil or 
gas is produced in paying quantities . . . .”173 
At trial, Jedlicka argued that the lessee failed to maintain continuous 
production in paying quantities because it had sustained a loss of $40 in 
1959.174  The lessee maintained that production from the wells amounted to 
production in paying quantities because their profits exceeded operating 
expenses, and they continued to operate those wells in a good-faith effort to 
turn a profit.175  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Jedlicka’s 
petition for appeal to consider whether the lower court misapplied 
Pennsylvania’s seminal case on the issue, Young v. Forest Oil, by “holding 
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that Pennsylvania employs a purely subjective test to determine whether an 
oil or gas lease has produced ‘in paying quantities.’”176 
At trial, and again on appeal, Jedlicka asserted that the Young decision 
called for an objective, mathematical calculation of profits minus operating 
expenses (sometimes referred to as “lifting expenses”).177  The operator’s 
subjective, good-faith judgment only comes into play, she argued, where a 
lease is producing in paying quantities (making a profit) but may not offset 
its total operating expenses.178  In making this argument, Jedlicka appears to 
have been urging the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to adopt the  
prudent-operator standard used in Texas and other mid-continent states.  
Specifically, Jedlicka claimed that because the lessees incurred a net loss in 
1959, the lease lapsed into a tenancy at will, which was terminable by the 
lessor at any time.179  The lessees, on the other hand, contended that even 
courts in jurisdictions that embrace an objective standard “have explicitly 
held that the term to be used in assessing the performance of the lease 
should be one long enough to ‘provide the information which a prudent 
operator would take into account in [deciding] whether to continue or 
abandon operation.’”180 
Rejecting Jedlicka’s contention that a one-year period of loss justifies 
the conclusion that a well failed to produce in paying quantities, the court 
held that profits must be measured over a reasonable period of time.181  The 
question of what amounts to a “reasonable” time period requires a careful 
review of the individual circumstances of each case and may “be driven by 
consideration of the good faith judgment of the operator.”182  Although the 
court declined to establish a bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a 
reasonable time period, it provided some guidance, noting that other courts 
found a two-year period reasonable while a thirteen-year period was not.183 
The court also explained the rationale behind its preferred subjective 
standard: 
The operator, who has assumed the obligations of the lease, has 
put his money and labor into the undertaking, and . . . is entitled to 
follow his own judgment.  If that is exercised in good faith, a 
different opinion by the lessor, or the experts, or the court, or all 
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combined, is of no consequence, and will not authorize a decree 
interfering with him.184 
The court further explained: 
Where . . . production on a well has been marginal or 
sporadic, such that, over some period, the well’s profits do not 
exceed its operating expenses, a determination of whether the 
well has produced in paying quantities requires consideration 
of the operator’s good faith judgment in maintaining operation 
of the well.  In assessing whether an operator has exercised 
his judgment in good faith in this regard, a court must 
consider the reasonableness of the time period during which 
the operator has continued his operation of the well in an 
effort to reestablish the well’s profitability.185 
Noting that Jedlicka presented no proof that the lessees acted in bad 
faith in continuing to operate under the lease, the court upheld the lease.186 
2. New York 
Courts in New York also defer to an operators’ good-faith judgment in 
deciding how much profit justifies the continued development of a 
particular leasehold, although New York has few cases on the issue.187 
3. Kentucky 
A 1934 Kentucky Court of Appeals case stemming from a claim by a 
lessee looking to abandon an unprofitable lease illustrates a similar 
deference to lessees’ good-faith judgment.188  In Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 
the lessor filed suit seeking royalties payable under a 1916 oil and gas lease 
that allowed the lessee to continue operating “as long as gas or oil is found 
in paying quantities on said premises,” with payment for gas contingent 
upon the additional provision that gas be found “in sufficient quantities to 
transport.”189  Although the lessee failed to drill any wells on the Riggsby 
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land, it operated multiple wells on neighboring lands.190  After contracting 
with a distribution company to sell gas from all of the surrounding wells 
and operating at a loss for several months, the lessee cancelled the contract 
and plugged several wells.191  The lessee then removed its pipeline from the 
Riggsbys’ land and sought to abandon the lease.192  Experts testified that the 
gas underlying the Riggsby property alone would have been too little to 
transport and certainly not enough to turn a profit given the distance 
between the well and existing pipelines.193  Despite this, the lessors argued 
that the lease terms obligated the lessee to either pay them $200 per year or 
drill one or two wells on the premises.194 
The court acknowledged the importance of allowing an experienced 
operator to determine whether a particular well produces enough gas to 
market in light of “the distance to the market, the expense of marketing, and 
every similar circumstance.”195  Noting that the object of leasing oil and gas 
is to “secure the oil or gas beneath the surface,” and that “the judgment of 
an experienced operator or lessee, if exercised in good faith, will prevail as 
against that of a lessor without experience,” the court held that a lessee may 
properly abandon a lease once it establishes the absence of gas beneath the 
surface, or that gas does not exist in paying quantities.196  
In the 1923 decision of Reynolds v. White Plains Oil & Gas Co., the 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky declined to cancel a lease where the three 
wells drilled produced only one barrel of oil every other day and the 
habendum clause allowed the lease to continue “so long thereafter as oil and 
gas are produced or operations are continued thereon.”197  While the lessor 
argued that the lease expired because it failed to produce in paying 
quantities, the court countered: 
The expression “in paying quantities” is not employed in the 
contract, but had it been so employed in the contract lessor would 
be in no better condition for the general rule is, as laid down in 
Thornton on Oil & Gas, sections, 148, 149 and 151, that the lessee 
who at his own expense drills wells, equips them and operates 
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them, has the exclusive right to determine when a well is 
producing oil or gas or both in paying quantities. 198 
The court explained that its decision protected the good-faith lessee 
who prosecuted work for development with reasonable diligence.199 
In Enfield v. Woods, the well drilled produced some oil, but even the 
lessee admitted the amount was very small.200  The lessee attempted to drill 
deeper, but even then it produced only “mere scum or showing of oil on the 
barrels or tank into which the well was pumped; that there was not enough 
oil to stain the ground.”201  The lessee contended that he could hold the 
lease because the habendum clause allowed it to continue “as long 
thereafter as oil and gas, or either, is produced.”202 
While the court acknowledged that the lease did not require the lessee 
to produce oil in paying quantities, it stated that the lessee is required to 
produced oil and gas “in such quantities as to be susceptible of division, so 
as to pay the landowner a royalty, even though small.  A mere showing of 
oil manifestly is not sufficient even though produced.  The production must 
be tangible and substantial, but it need not be great.”203  The court 
acknowledged the position that merely requiring oil and gas to be produced 
leaves room for a lease to continue where production exists but does not 
pay.204  Yet, the court went on to say that the general rule “is to hold the 
expression ‘oil well’ or ‘gas well’ as used in a lease contract to mean an oil 
well or gas well which can be profitably operated as such.”205  Thus, the 
court agreed with the trial court’s finding that the well was a non-producer 
and therefore the lease expired.206 
In the 1946 case of Young v. Dunn, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
made it clear that the lessee need not actually sell gas to hold a lease, 
although its failure to exercise reasonable diligence in marketing gas could 
amount to abandonment.207  The Kentucky Court of Appeals reiterated this 
position in 2000, stating: “consummation of a sale is not necessarily the 
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determining factor of whether the lessee has marketed the gas.”208  Rather, a 
court must examine: 
[A]ll of the circumstances, such as the absence of a market and the 
diligence of a lessee in seeking a market, the failure of the lessor to 
make a demand, the acceptance by a lessor of other benefits under 
the lease, whether it was necessary to make abnormal expenditures 
to market the product, and whether the delay was to gain better 
marketing terms.209 
Like the case law history of Illinois and West Virginia discussed more 
particularly below, this line of Kentucky cases illustrates that the mere 
discovery position taken by the Kentucky courts early on appears to have 
softened to a position that more closely resembles the capability rule 
adopted by Oklahoma courts. 
4. West Virginia 
Like Kentucky, West Virginia courts once required very little 
production to extend a lease. South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass210 illustrates 
the “mere discovery” position the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia took in the early twentieth century.  The habendum clause at issue 
in Snodgrass permitted the lessee to continue operating after the ten-year 
primary term for “as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them is 
produced therefrom.”211  With the end of the primary term less than a week 
away, South Penn Oil Company discovered oil on the property in trace 
amounts.212  On the very day the primary term expired, South Penn shot a 
well.213  One week later, it began pumping the well and continued to do so 
for some time.214  Meanwhile, after attempting to terminate the lease by 
refusing to accept the final delay rental payments, the lessors granted new 
leases on the property to different developers.215  The lessors and the new 
lessees then joined forces to oust South Penn, who had already paid the 
lessors around $2,000 in rentals and drilled a well to a depth of 2,038 
feet.216  South Penn filed suit against the lessors and the new lessees. 
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Analyzing the lease language in light of the spirit and purpose of the 
contract between the parties, the court noted that the habendum clause 
exists to allow a lessee acting diligently, skillfully, and in good faith to 
continue operating and to attempt to recover its costs.217  Given that 
purpose, the court said, simply discovering oil—even with only trace 
amounts of production—vests an interest and gives way to a continued right 
to explore and produce that oil.218  The lessee takes “enormous risks and 
burdens” by drilling a well, and “[a]dherence to the strict letter of the 
extension clause would make no allowance for [delays], and inflict 
disastrous losses upon diligent and honest lessees in many instances—a 
consequence plainly not within the intent of either party.”219  The court 
declared the lessee’s decision not to drill until the last quarter of the primary 
term well within its rights under the contract and held that the discovery of 
oil during the primary term extended the lease into its secondary term.220 
Just five years after deciding Snodgrass, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of West Virginia noted the importance of being able to actually market the 
oil and gas produced from the leasehold.  That case, Barbour, Stedman & 
Co. v. Tompkins,221 involved a lease for a primary term of five years and “as 
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced therefrom in paying quantities.”222  
Three to four days before the expiration of the primary term, the lessee 
discovered gas.223  The well produced 100,000 to 500,000 cubic feet of gas 
per day, which the lessee then sold in the local gas markets.224  The 
landowner sued to cancel the lease, arguing that the output did not amount 
to “paying quantities.”225 
The operative question, the court said, becomes “not how much may be 
derived from a sale of the gas, but rather whether it may be sold in the 
market for consumption as fuel with reasonable expectation of profitable 
returns in excess of costs and expenses.”226  Again stating that the phrase 
“in paying quantities” must be considered in light of the lessee’s good-faith 
judgment, the court held that the lessor cannot forfeit the lease merely 
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because “he thinks the quantity of gas discovered therein was not sufficient 
to constitute a paying well . . . .”227 
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia pointed out the importance of the operator’s profit in determining 
whether a lease is held by production.  In Goodwin v. Wright, the defendant 
contended that its lease remained valid during its secondary term solely 
because the well on the property supplied the lessors with gas for their 
home.228  Having granted a lease in 1961 for a primary term of ten years 
and “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from the 
said lands,” Paul and Dorothy Goodwin sought to terminate the lease in 
1974, claiming it had expired on its terms.229  Both parties agreed that the 
lessee had not produced oil or gas on the land for four years and that the 
lessors received no rental payments or royalties after “1968 or 1969,” at 
least one year before the lessee assigned the lease to the defendant.230  In 
turn, the operator argued that the benefit the Goodwins received in the form 
of free gas for their home justified extending the term of the lease.231 
Revisiting the question of whether “produced” means “produced in 
paying quantities,” the court cited Garcia v. King, noting that the 
landowner’s purpose in executing a lease “is to have the oil and gas on the 
leased premises produced and marketed so that he may receive his royalty 
therefrom, and the purpose of the lessee is to discover and produce oil and 
gas in such quantities as will yield him a profit.”232  Turning to the lease at 
issue, the court pointed out that the lessee not only failed to properly pay 
either rental or royalty, but that it also made no attempt to produce or 
market the oil or gas.233  The court emphasized the fact that “‘[t]he 
objective of the lease is not merely to have oil or gas flow from the ground 
but to obtain production that is commercially profitable to both parties.’”234  
Absent paying production, the court noted, the lessee cannot recover its 
drilling costs.  Further, the court pointed out, the lessor contemplates more 
than the receipt of an ancillary benefit such as free gas for domestic use 
when granting a lease.235  Stating that the production required would result 
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in a royalty payment to the lessor, the court held that the lease had expired 
on its terms. 236 
C. MIDWESTERN STATES 
When addressing questions involving the habendum clause, courts in 
the Midwest often rely on established law from the Midcontinent or the 
East. 
1. Illinois 
In Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., another of the cases discussed by the 
Texas Supreme Court in its Garcia holding,237 the Supreme Court of 
Illinois considered the issue of requisite production under a lease where the 
habendum clause did not require production in paying quantities, but rather 
allowed the lessee to continue operating for five years and “so long 
thereafter as oil or gas is produced thereon.”238  Less than a week before the 
expiration of the primary term, the lessee drilled a well.239  The well 
produced twelve barrels of oil per day for the first two days and 
insignificant amounts thereafter.240  The court stated that the well’s 
continual oil production, albeit “so small as to make the venture 
unprofitable,” satisfied the requirements of “the strict letter of the lease,” 
and the court held that it had not expired by its terms.241 
In 1980, an Illinois Court of Appeals again analyzed a lease where the 
habendum clause lacked a “paying quantities” requirement in Doty v. Key 
Oil, Inc..242  Key Oil discovered gas, which it flared, but produced no oil.243  
The lessors demanded release of the lease, and then Key Oil shut in the 
well.244  At trial, Key Oil blamed its lack of production on the fact that the 
distance from the well to a pipeline prevented it from profitably marketing 
the gas.245  The trial court “commented that the flaring of the well appeared 
to be inconsistent with an intention to produce gas at some later date” and 
held that the lease had expired on its terms.246  On appeal, Key Oil argued 
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that its payment of shut-in royalties saved the lease.247  The court pointed 
out that shut-in clauses exist to extend leases where the lessee discovers gas 
in paying quantities during the primary term but finds no market for it.248  
Noting that the prior decision in Gillespie contradicted the position of other 
courts—that “the production necessary to extend a lease must be in paying 
quantities”—the court distinguished the Gillespie decision rather than 
overruling it.249  While the habendum clause in this case did not require 
production in paying quantities, a provision referring to the shut-in clause 
provided that “if such payment or tender is made, this lease shall continue 
in force and it shall be considered that gas is being produced from the 
leased premises in paying quantities.”250  When read together, the court 
said, these clauses revealed the parties’ intent to require production in 
paying quantities to extend the lease under the habendum clause.251  Since 
Key Oil flared the only gas produced, and it found no oil at all, the court 
explained that “the lease was not extended under the habendum clause for 
the simple reason that there was no production whatsoever, in any accepted 
sense of the term.”252 
An Illinois Court of Appeals once again distinguished Gillespie and 
specifically declined to overrule it in 1984 when considering similar lease 
language in Pieszchalski v. Oslanger.253  The lessees in that case relied on 
Gillespie at trial, and the trial court declared that Gillespie no longer “states 
the law in Illinois.”254  The Illinois Court of Appeals disagreed, again 
distinguishing the case by saying: “it does not stand for the proposition 
these defendants attribute to it, i.e., that any production, however meager, is 
sufficient in any event to extend an oil and gas lease beyond the primary 
term under a habendum clause not requiring production of oil or gas in 
paying quantities.”255  In Gillespie, the court explained, the lessee 
continually produced oil from the well and the habendum clause allowed 
the lease to continue “so long thereafter as oil or gas was ‘produced.’”256 
In the lease at issue in Pieszchalski, the lessee pumped the single well 
until it filled the saltwater pit and then shut it down.257  Although the well 
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produced some oil, no one received any proceeds from the sale of oil.258  
Noting that lease construction requires courts to give effect to parties’ 
intent, the court explained that the lease must also be interpreted in light of 
its spirit and purpose: 
[T]o secure development of the property for the mutual benefit of 
the parties . . . Obviously, if the lease could no longer be operated 
at a profit, there were no fruits for them to reap.  The lessors 
should not be required to suffer a continuation of the lease after the 
expiration of the primary period merely for speculation purposes 
on the part of the lessees.259 
The court upheld the trial court’s finding that the lease failed to 
produce and therefore terminated on its terms.260 
While Gillespie remains good law in Illinois, in several subsequent 
cases, Illinois courts have taken great pains to explain that the rationale 
applied in Gillespie was fact-specific.  Furthermore, the reasoning in these 
later decisions aligns with that of other courts across the country that 
require payment of royalties to the lessor as a minimum standard for a lease 
to be held by production. 
2. Indiana 
In the 1905 case of Manhattan Oil Co. v. Carrell, the Supreme Court of 
Indiana interpreted a lease that required the lessee to drill additional wells 
every ninety days after completing the first well until they completed five 
wells “if oil is found in paying quantities.”261  After drilling one producing 
well, the lessee remained on the land and continued to work that same well 
for over three years.262  The lessor then sued to recover the penalty due for 
the lessee’s failure to drill additional wells.263  The jury instructions used at 
the trial essentially stated the following: 
[I]f oil was found in the test or first well in a sufficient quantity to 
pay a profit, however small, in excess of the cost of producing it, 
excluding the cost of drilling the well and of equipment, then oil 
was found in paying quantities, within the meaning of the contract, 
and the defendant would be required to drill the four additional 
wells, even though it became manifest that the oil to be obtained 
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would not repay first cost, and the enterprise, as a whole, result in 
a loss to the defendant. 264 
Examining the contract in light of the parties’ likely purpose and intent, 
the court stated that additional wells were to be drilled only if oil were 
found in such quantity that ordinarily prudent persons could “expect a 
reasonable profit on the full sum required to be expended in the prosecution 
of the enterprise.”265  This determination must be left to the lessee, the court 
said, and made in good faith based upon sound business principles.266 
3. Michigan 
The leases at issue in the 1982 case of Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline 
Co. v. Michigan National Bank, which was decided by the Michigan Court 
of Appeals, formed part of a gas storage field initially operated by the 
Michigan Consolidated Gas Company.267  After an interstate transmission 
company applied to the Michigan Public Service Commission to condemn 
certain parts of the storage field, the operator cut back production to the 
amount needed to operate heaters at a compressor station and provide free 
gas for domestic use in several homes.268  With a condemnation action 
pending, the lessors challenged the validity of the underlying leases, which 
contained habendum clauses allowing the leases to continue “as long 
thereafter as oil and gas; or either of them, is produced by lessee from said 
land or from a communitized unit.”269 
The appellants in the case contended that “Consolidated acted as a 
reasonable and prudent operator in deciding to cut back its market of gas” 
from the storage field in light of the impending condemnation action.270  
Relying on the factors set forth in Clifton v. Koontz as to various matters to 
be considered under that standard, the court explained that the lessor must 
establish two things to terminate a lease:  “first, that the operator/lessee was 
not making a profit from the operation of the field; second that a reasonably 
prudent operator would not have continued to operate the field under 
similar circumstances.”271  The court agreed that a reasonable and prudent 
operator would have ceased marketing the gas, since leaving the gas in 
place and waiting for the condemnation award meant it could obtain a profit 
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at fair market value just the same as if it sold the gas at market.272  This 
standard allows an operator to act in its best interests, the court explained, 
“so long as the interests of the lessor are not substantially impaired,” and 
the lessors in this case presented no evidence of that.273  The dissenting 
judge contended that the reasonable and prudent operator standard did not 
apply because the operator failed to make shut-in royalty payments.274  The 
majority rejected this argument, finding instead that production continued 
during this time and that any temporary cessation that occured was 
reasonable.275 
4. Ohio 
Ohio jurisprudence reflects a certain deference to a lessee’s good-faith 
judgment regarding how much production justifies continued operations but 
with limitations that hew toward the “actual production” approach favored 
by Texas courts.276  Take, for example, a 1926 Court of Appeals decision. 
Having obtained a lease for a primary term of ten years and “as much 
longer as oil or gas is found in paying quantities,” the lessee-defendant in 
Tedrow v. Shaffer drilled a well not long after taking the lease and pumped 
a small amount of oil from it.277  For the next seven years, the lessee paid 
delay rentals to the lessor but failed to further develop the oil and gas.278  
One month prior to the expiration of the primary term, the lessee assigned 
the lease to a developer who promptly entered the premises, built roads, and 
began pumping oil from the well on the very day the primary term 
expired.279 
Equating the term “found” with the term “produced,” the Court of 
Appeals explained that “production or finding of oil is a condition 
precedent to the extension of the definite term.”280  The lessee cannot 
simply produce oil in paying quantities on the last day of the term; rather, 
“he must have been producing it in paying quantities for some substantial or 
reasonable time prior to the final day of such term, so that it clearly appears, 
when the end of such term comes, that he is in good faith actually finding 
 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id. at 546. 
274.  Id. at 546-47 (Daniels, J., dissenting). 
275.  Id. at 546 (majority opinion). 
276.  See Fielder, supra note 3, at 3. 
277.  155 N.E. 510, 510 (Ohio Ct. App. 1926). 
278.  Id. 
279.  Id. 
280.  Id. at 511. 
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oil in paying quantities.”281  Deeming the lessee’s last-ditch efforts 
inadequate, the court held that the lease had expired.282 
The holding in Tedrow remains good law in Ohio.  In the 1992 decision 
of American Energy Services, Inc. v. Lekan, the Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed its decision in Tedrow, stating unequivocally that a lessee’s 
good-faith belief that a well is capable of producing in paying quantities “is 
not enough to hold a lease in its secondary term.  The law of Ohio requires 
that potential production be translated into actual production.”283  In that 
case, the court focused on the fact that the lessee never connected the well 
to a pipeline and the well produced no oil or gas whatsoever over a period 
of seventeen years.284  The court also discussed the implied duty to market 
and explained that the existence of a shut-in royalty clause merely modifies 
this obligation but “does not negate the duty to use due diligence to sell the 
production.”285 
In Litton v. Geisler, the Court of Appeals characterized the production 
required to extend a lease beyond its primary term as “that quantity which 
will bring a reasonable pecuniary return in excess of the cost of production, 
regardless of any particular amount of profit derivable from the operation of 
the well.”286  It explained that the lessee may determine what quantity 
satisfies this standard, so long as he exercises his judgment in good faith.287  
The court explained that: 
[T]he fact it is questionable whether oil wells on land held under a 
lease operative only so long as oil or gas should be found in 
paying quantities will ever yield a reasonable profit on the 
investment is not sufficient ground for vacating the lease; in the 
absence of fraud, the lessee is the sole judge of this question, and 
as long as he can make a profit therefrom he will be permitted to 
do so.  The mere fact that a lessee under such a lease has failed to 
operate the wells for some time, will not be ground for vacating 
such lease, where such lessee shows good and sufficient reason 
why it has been impracticable for him to do so.288 
 
281.  Id. 
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283.  598 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
284.  Id. at 1321.  
285.  Id. at 1322. 
286.  76 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (quoting Barbour, Stedman & Co. v. 
Tompkins, 93 S.E. 1038, 1038 (W. Va. 1917)). 
287.  Id. 
288.  Id. at 743-44. 
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In Blausey v. Stein, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that the 
lessee’s ability to minimize his costs should “inure to his benefit in a 
determination of whether a well produces in paying quantities” and that the 
lessee should be “allowed to attempt to recoup his initial investment for as 
long as he continues to derive any financial benefit from production.”289  
The property owner in Blausey asked the court to find the lease on her land 
void for failure to produce in paying quantities.290  To support her case, the 
landowner contended that the lessee operated at a loss for six years because 
his expenses, including all the labor needed to produce oil from the lease, 
exceeded the income from the well.291 
In addressing this claim, the court explained that “the term ‘paying 
quantities’ . . . has been construed by the weight of authority to mean 
‘quantities of oil or gas sufficient to yield a profit, even small, to the lessee 
over operating expenses, even though the drilling costs, or equipping costs, 
are not recovered, and even though the undertaking as a whole may thus 
result in a loss.’”292  The court excluded the lessee’s labor from total 
operating expenses in the calculation of profits versus costs, which left him 
with a small income from the sale of oil from the well and satisfied the 
requirement that oil or gas be “found in paying quantities.”293 
5. North Dakota 
In the case of Greenfield v. Thill, in which the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota held that a temporary cessation of production during the secondary 
term does not automatically terminate a defeasible-term interest acquired by 
deed, the court explained in a footnote that “it is generally recognized that 
‘found in paying quantities’ is synonymous with ‘produced in paying 
quantities.’”294  We found no subsequent reported cases in which the North 
Dakota Supreme Court explained its view as to the amount of production 
required to meet this standard or the appropriate test to be applied to see if 
the standard has been met. 
6. South Dakota 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota discussed the production needed 
to carry a lease into its secondary term in Cleveland Stone Co. v. 
 
289.  400 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ohio 1980). 
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292.  Id. (quoting Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Meaning of ‘Paying Quantities’ in Oil 
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Hollingsworth.295  The defendant lessee cited a West Virginia case, South 
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,296 which we discussed in detail hereinabove,297 
for the proposition that the mere discovery of minerals during the primary 
term could carry a lease into its secondary term so long as the lessee 
diligently continued operations.298  The court observed that the trial court 
seemed “to have been of the opinion that a mere showing of oil was not 
sufficient, but tangible and substantial production was necessary to extend 
the term of the lease.”299  However, both the trial court and the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota decided the case on other grounds.300 
D. WESTERN STATES 
Western states have the least developed case law on this issue.  As a 
result, we have included cases that address the issue rather narrowly. 
1. California 
We found very few Supreme Court cases in California regarding 
habendum clause interpretation,301 although several lower courts have 
addressed the issue.302  For example, in 1932, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that a well produced in paying quantities “as long as the 
returns from a well drilled in accordance with the lease exceed the cost of 
operation after completion, although the well may never repay the drilling 
costs, and the operation as a whole may result in a loss.”303  In 1990, the 
California Court of Appeals addressed the question of the proper time 
period to consider when assessing whether a well produced in paying 
quantities.  In Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., the owner of two lots in Long Beach 
leased her property to Coal Oil in 1951 for a primary term of twenty years 
and “so long thereafter as . . . [hydrocarbons were produced] therefrom.”304  
Lough sued to quiet title in 1982, arguing, among other things, that the 
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1951 lease had terminated for failure to produce in paying quantities.305  At 
trial, the facts showed that during an eighteen-month period from July 1981 
to December 1982, Coal Oil experienced a loss of $15,846.62 and during a 
fifty-one-month period from January 1983 to March 1987, the company 
again suffered serious losses.306  Finding these periods of time adequate to 
provide a reasonable financial picture of the lease’s profitability, the Court 
of Appeals upheld the lower court’s finding that the lease terminated for 
failure to produce in sufficient paying quantities.307 
In San Mateo Community College District v. Half Moon Bay 
Partnership, the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District 
considered exactly what type of drilling activity was needed to extend a 
lease past its primary term.308  The habendum clause in the lease at issue 
provided that the lessee could continue “its operation past the termination 
date as to each well producing or being drilled at the time and in respect to 
which lessee is not in default.  Lessee’s right to continued operation as to 
said well(s) shall continue so long as such well(s) shall produce oil in 
paying quantities.”309  The court held that language of the lease required 
either a producing well or active drilling of a new well at the end of the 
primary term in order to extend the lease.310 
2. Montana 
In Montana, “oil and gas leases are to be construed liberally in favor of 
the lessor and strictly against the lessee.”311  The Supreme Court of 
Montana stopped short of requiring oil and gas to be sold in order to extend 
a lease into its secondary term in a 1973 decision where the habendum 
clause allowed the lease to continue “as long thereafter as oil or gas, or 
either of them, is produced . . . .”312  The parties amended the original lease 
several times, and eventually the habendum clause read:  “as long as oil or 
gas was produced and the lessee exercises reasonable diligence in 
development.”313  The first well drilled had gas flow of 250,000 to 500,000 
cubic feet per day that was never sold commercially, and the lessee began 
drilling a second well on the last day of the term. 314 
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The court stated that the test for “whether there was sufficient 
production or whether the lessee was acting with reasonable diligence in 
producing and marketing the gas from the leased lands is the diligence 
which would be exercised by the ordinary prudent operator having regard to 
the interests of both lessor and lessee.”315  It further noted that “mere 
discovery of oil and gas is not sufficient,” but that the discovery of gas in 
commercial quantities during the primary term satisfied the “thereafter” 
provision “for a period of time, and thereby extends the lease into the 
secondary term.  After the mineral is discovered the lessee is required to use 
reasonable diligence in operating the well and marketing the product within 
a reasonable time.”316  Once into the secondary term, the court noted 
production must be in “paying quantities,” defined as such quantities as will 
pay a profit over operating expenses.317  Although the court did not 
explicitly adopt the capability rule in this case, its explanation implies that 
merely operating diligently to produce and market may be enough to extend 
a lease. 
3. Nevada 
Nevada has no case law concerning “paying quantities” language in 
reference to oil and gas leases, but it clearly recognizes the concept.  
Nevada Statutory law provides that “[a] lease may be for a fixed period, and 
so long thereafter as minerals, oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances or 
geothermal resources are produced in paying quantities from the property 
leased . . . .”318 
4. New Mexico 
In Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Gilbreath, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether a four-month gap in production 
terminated a lease that had extended well into its secondary term.319  The 
lessors leased their property in 1959 for five years and “as long thereafter as 
oil, gas, casinghead gas, or other mineral or any of them is or can be 
produced.”320  The lessee drilled only one well on the property, which 
produced gas continually until December 1990, when the pressure in the 
well suddenly dropped and failed to force the gas into the pipeline.321  In 
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January 1991, the lessees took steps to increase the pressure in the well, and 
production resumed in March 1991.322 
Meanwhile, the lessee began negotiating a farm-out agreement with 
plaintiff Maralex Resources, who ordered a title opinion on the Gilbreath’s 
mineral interest.323  The title opinion stated that the lease terminated on its 
terms due to lack of production from December 1990 until March 1991 
because the lessees failed to pay shut-in royalty payments.324  The lessee 
then tendered a royalty payment to the lessors for the period of October 
1989 to December 1990, but the lessors refused it and executed new leases 
to Maralex. 325  The new lessee filed suit, claiming that the lease ended 
when production ceased.326 
Citing Clifton v. Koontz, the court stated generally that to hold a lease 
in its secondary term, production must be in “‘paying quantities,’ such that 
the income generated from oil and gas production exceeds operating costs,” 
and the court proceeded to examine whether the lessee maintained the lease 
via one of the savings clauses.327  The defendant argued that even if the 
lessee had paid shut-in royalties once production stopped, the lease would 
still have died because the well was not “capable” of production in paying 
quantities.328  The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed, stating that the shut-
in clause in the lease at issue only allowed those payments to save the lease 
when the well remained capable of producing gas.329  Finding no evidence 
that the well could have produced gas, and that the lessees could not rely on 
any other savings clauses in the lease, the court held that the lease ended 
when production ceased.330 
5. Oregon 
The Supreme Court of Oregon acknowledged the lack of case law on 
oil and gas leases in the state when it addressed the question of whether a 
lessee could hold a lease in its secondary term by merely prospecting for 
minerals in Freemont Lumber Co. v. Starrel Petoleum.331  That case also 
did not involve an oil and gas lease, but the court looked to oil and gas law 
to help inform its decision, noting “the act required of the lessee for the 
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extension of the lease beyond the definite term is that he be engaged in 
production of oil or gas from the land, in some quantity, before and at the 
end of the definite term.”332  The court’s discussion in this case leaves open 
the question of just how much production is required to take the lease into 
its second term. 
6. Wyoming 
Wyoming courts have defined a well as a “commercial producer” when 
it pays “a profit to the lessee, over operating expenses for its operation . . . 
even if the profit is small and the costs of development may never be 
recovered.”333 
III. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the body of case law on habendum clauses in this country 
runs a common theme:  courts must carefully balance lessors’ desire to 
benefit financially from the development of their property with oil and gas 
operators’ interest in protecting their investment.  The difference lies in 
what tips the scale to one side or the other.  The law in most states in the 
East—at least on paper—appears to favor operators with its continued 
reliance on the subjective, good-faith operator standard.  Without evidence 
of some ill intent, courts in the East tend to defer to the operator’s best 
judgment in deciding whether to continue operating a lease.  By contrast, 
courts in the Midcontinent delve deeply into the particular actions of the 
lessee, seemingly holding operators to a more stringent standard.  Yet, those 
courts also rely on operators’ judgment embodied in the “prudent operator” 
test, thus begging the question of whether the tests these courts have taken 
such care to distinguish actually bring about different results.  From the 
perspective of an operator looking to ensure that a lease remains valid, the 
focus must be on recognizing this slight distinction and ensuring that one’s 
leasehold activity and production meets the individual state’s threshold for 
leases considered to be held by production. 
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